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Work and the Legal Person in Thomas More’s Utopia
Andreea D. Boboc, Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether expressed as opus, ars, or labor, work figures prominently in
Thomas More’s Utopia, anchoring in law the personhood of both sovereign and
1
lawbreaker. This paper discusses the kinds of work involved in shaping the legal
person of the sovereign and the thief, and explains how these disparate legal
persons are surprisingly joined together by the concept of royal justice. My
argument draws upon the shifting attitudes towards the death penalty for theft in
early modern England, the effects of enclosure under Henry VIII, and the long
tradition of viewing medieval and early modern kings as artisans.
Focusing on work as a critical ingredient in defining the person-at-law allows
us to reconcile the legal complexities of Utopia, a text that on the surface
purports to dispense with the subtleties of law and lawyers altogether. Already in
Book I, the English lawyer, a defender of the status quo, is unceremoniously
silenced by the Cardinal, who prefers to hear Raphael Hythloday’s arguments
against the death penalty for theft; and in Book II, readers learn not only that
lawyers are banished from Utopia, but also that Utopians work as lawyers for
themselves:
As for lawyers, a class of men whose trade it is to manipulate cases and
multiply quibbles, they exclude them entirely. They think it is practical
for each man to plead his own case, and say the same thing to the judge
that he would tell his lawyer. This makes for less confusion and readier
access to the truth. [ . . . ] This sort of plain dealing is hard to find in
other nations, where they have such a mass of incomprehensibly intricate
laws. But in Utopia everyone is a legal expert. For the laws are very few,
as I said, and they consider the most obvious interpretation of the law to
2
be the fairest.
In a text replete with such legal iconoclasm, why concentrate on the legal
person at all? As I argued elsewhere, while the pre-modern English legal person
is conceptually ambiguous and difficult, its inherent tensions and idiosyncrasies

* A version of this paper was given at the University of the Pacific School of Law (McGeorge) on
February 25, 2016, as part of the symposium UTOPIA 500. I am grateful to Professor Michael Malloy and to
his students for the illuminating conversation that ensued. I am also grateful to Professor James Boyd White for
his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA: LATIN TEXT AND ENGLISH (George M. Logan, Robert M. Adams & Clarence
H. Miller eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
2. Id. at 195.
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make it particularly suitable for literary interpretation—my métier as a literary
3
historian—and interdisciplinary work. Moreover, the law of persons precedes
any other kind of law: we cannot talk about penalties in criminal law, for
instance, without having a nuanced understanding of those whom we punish—a
person-at-law. Joseph Vining reminds us that:
Persons do not come before a court self-defined or ready-made. A court
must make a judgment before it can perceive, hear, or talk about “he,”
“she,” “you,” “it,” “the plaintiff,” “the challenger,” or whatever other
general term is used to refer to those who make the arguments on the
merits. That judgment is guided by law like any other judgment. [ . . . ]
4
The law of legal persons is separable and prior to any particular case.
When defining a person-at-law, courts implicitly establish a person’s social
5
function. The legal and the social person cannot be divorced from one another.
In fact, as Elizabeth Fowler points out, “legal persons . . . are best understood as
personifications of social relations, as abstractions of social bonds that have been
6
elaborated and given discursive life.” Social relations, in turn, are best delineated
in the distribution of labor, especially in a society roughly divided into “those
7
who pray, those who work, and those who fight.”
To be sure, modern readers cannot take at face value More’s proposition that
a criminal’s personhood be reworked though forced labor; nor can readers fully
embrace it as a solution to contemporary problems within the criminal justice
system. For American readers, the groups of convicts fettered together in Utopia
8
bring to mind the chain gangs of the 1930s with all their racist connotations. The
9
British, too, would sooner leave their penal labor laws in the early 20th century.
Such slippages of the early modern imaginary into modern legal practice are a

3. THEORIZING LEGAL PERSONHOOD IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1–28 (Andreea D. Boboc ed., Leiden:
Brill Academic Publishers, 2015). See What We Talk about When We Talk about Persons: The Language of a
Legal Fiction HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1745–68 (2001). [hereinafter Talk about Persons] (discussing modern legal
persons).
4. JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 144 (Yale Univ. Press 1978).
5. Talk about Persons, supra note 3, at 1760–61.
6. ELIZABETH FOWLER, LITERARY CHARACTER: THE HUMAN FIGURE IN EARLY ENGLISH WRITING 186
(Cornell Univ. Press 2003).
7. MEDIEVIALIST.NET, Those Who Pray, Those Who Work, Those Who Fight (Jan. 31, 2016)
http://www.medievalists.net/2016/01/31/those-who-pray-those-who-work-those-who-fight/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Tessa M. Gorman, Back on the Chain Gang: Why the Eighth Amendment and the History of Slavery
Proscribe the Resurgence of Chain Gangs, 85 CAL. L. REV. 441, 441–78 (1997).
9. England and Wales abolish penal servitude, hard labor, and prison divisions in 1948 through an act of
Parliament called The Criminal Justice Act. The Criminal Justice Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 58 (Eng. & Wales).
Scotland and Northern Ireland make similar provisions in 1949 and 1953, respectively. Criminal Justice
(Scotland) Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 c. 49 (Scot.); Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1953, c. 14 (N.
Ir.), http://origin-www.legislation.gov.uk/apni/1953/14 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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testament to the afterlife of Utopia, however stark they may seem for our modern
sensibilities.
Nevertheless, when it comes to communal engagement with the
rehabilitation of criminals, the American criminal justice system has yet to devise
better solutions than More’s utopian blueprint, according to which the entire
community of the realm watches over those convicted of crimes and helps with
their rehabilitation.
In a recent article that appeared in The Atlantic, Whitney Benns explains how
the exception to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution is put to work in
10
Louisiana by using the example of Angola Prison. Because section one of the
Amendment forbids slavery or involuntary servitude “except as punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,” incarcerated persons
11
may be compelled to work against their will. Refusal to work can result in harsh
punishments, such as “solitary confinement . . . and revocation of family
12
visitations.” These kinds of punitive measures have been repeatedly correlated
with a variety of mental health issues, most recently in Stephen C. Richards’
13
provocative volume on the Marion Experiment. Yet such practices persist in
criminal sentencing, and solitary confinement was only recently banned for
14
juveniles in federal prison in 2016.
Solitary confinement is an 18th century penal development, ironically
introduced with good intentions by the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the
Miseries of Public Prisons, a group composed largely of Quakers, who met for
15
the first time at the house of Benjamin Franklin in 1787. The idea was to give
prisoners the privacy necessary to contemplate their sins, repent, and find
redemption while safeguarding them against “more viscerally cruel punishments
such as flogging, the public humiliations of the pillory and stocks, and the misery
16
of filthy, violent, overcrowded jails.” To be fair, the initiators of solitary
confinement could not have foreseen its pernicious effects stemming from lack of
meaningful work and companionship, especially over prolonged periods of time.
Nevertheless, as Laura Rovner points out, “as far back as 1890, the U.S. Supreme

10. I am grateful to Cynthia Dobbs for pointing this article out to me. Whitney Benns, American Slavery,
Reinvented, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prisonlabor-in-america/406177/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 1.
12. Benns, supra note 10.
13. THE MARION EXPERIMENT: LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND THE SUPERMAX MOVEMENT
(Stephen C. Richards ed., Southern Illinois Univ. Press 2015) [hereinafter MARION EXPERIMENT].
14. Juliet Eilperin, Obama Bans Solitary Confinement for Juveniles in Federal Prisons, WASH. POST
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-bans-solitary-confinement-for-juveniles-infederal-prisons/2016/01/25/056e14b2-c3a2-11e5-9693-933a4d31bcc8_story.html (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
15. MARION EXPERIMENT, supra note 13, at 141.
16. HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE: VOICES FROM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 3 (Jean Casella et al. eds.,
2016).
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Court recognized the significant harms solitary confinement causes and nearly
17
declared it unconstitutional.” What is astonishing, however, is that
contemporary jails retain and expand on this form of lawful torture despite (or
18
perhaps, because of) its deleterious effects on the human psyche. In many jails,
solitary confinement is purposefully deployed as a mechanism of intimidation
19
and control. In his 2015 plea to Congress, Justice Kennedy spoke against the
twin evils of prison overcrowding and solitary confinement, and criticized
lawmakers for focusing more on guilt and innocence rather than correction and
20
rehabilitation.
Ironically, although the Middle Ages have traditionally been demonized as a
cruel and primitive time, medieval lawmakers would not have contrived a
punishment so ruthless that it completely cut off an individual’s ties to the
21
community of the realm. In fact, as G. Geltner has taught us:
Most male prisoners, for example, could maintain their extramural status
by situating themselves in an appropriate ward, through arranging for
suitable services, and by relying on existing patronage ties. . . . Medieval
prisons operated as spatial and temporal extensions of urban
22
[communities], connecting free society back to itself.
Moreover, medieval criminal law allowed offenders to abjure the realm
under the protection of sanctuary (and, in time, find a different community to
23
belong to). In ecclesiastic law, excommunication, the harshest form of
punishment, which involved public shaming, shunning, or even banishment,
could be revoked in response to public penance, thus restoring individuals’ ties to
24
their communities. Recent legal research supports such medieval legal
remedies, demonstrating that not only correction and rehabilitation, but also
deterrence and crime prevention, fail without the involvement of the community25
at-large.
Work is the most meaningful form of communal participation, and
experience shows that convicts are more likely to do the internal work necessary
17. Laura Rovner, Solitary Confinement and the Law, in HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE: VOICES FROM
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 179, 179 (Jean Casella et al. eds., 2016).
18. MARION EXPERIMENT, supra note 13, at 60–61.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Editorial Board, Justice Kennedy’s Plea to Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/opinion/sunday/justice-kennedys-plea-to-congress.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
21. GUY GELTNER, FLOGGING OTHERS: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND CULTURAL IDENTITY FROM
ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 62–68 (2014).
22. GUY GELTNER, THE MEDIEVAL PRISON: A SOCIAL HISTORY 81 (2014).
23. Eilperin, supra note 14.
24. Id.
25. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF
SANCTION (2009).
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to rehabilitate themselves when inspired by good role models from the
26
community of the realm. In fact, as Etienne Benson reports, before the “punitive
turn” of the 1970s, inmates were routinely encouraged to make progress towards
their rehabilitation and reintegration in society by “develop[ing] occupational
27
skills and resolv[ing] psychological problems.” One critical difference between
More’s fictional proposals for rehabilitating criminals through work and similar
measures in the American justice system is that More’s utopian offenders are
28
reintegrated into the community-at-large immediately after sentencing. In
contrast, American offenders are allowed to commune only with other criminals
and their wardens during their prison sentence while their ultimate reintegration
29
into the community remains doubtful. Because they lack professional skills and
often suffer from substance abuse and mental health issues, not to mention
societal bias, up to seventy percent of American male parolees are prone to
30
recidivism within three years of their release.
More imagines a solution for the prison-overcrowding problem (that also
plagued his medieval and early modern contemporaries) without making “good
31
behavior” in prison the prerequisite for community reintegration. In contrast,
“good behavior” in American prisons often means turning a blind eye to racism
32
and labor law violations embedded in some prison practices. Refusal to work in
American prisons is routinely construed as refusal to integrate, not as a protest
33
against the abuses to which many prisoners are subjected behind prison walls.
More’s convicts do not face such problems since the whole community keeps a
watchful eye on them from the beginning of their sentence and takes a
34
compassionate interest in their moral rehabilitation and safety.
Psychologically, too, More’s proposal for the rehabilitation of criminals is
superior to current American practice. The proposal places agency squarely into
the hands of convicts, who must progress morally or risk disappointing their
community-at-large, which munificently welcomes them back despite their
misdeeds. In More’s Utopia, community models generosity for the evildoers,

26. NATHAN JAMES, OFFENDER REENTRY: CORRECTIONAL STATISTICS, REINTEGRATION INTO THE
COMMUNITY, AND RECIDIVISM 14 (Jan. 12, 2015).
27. Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2003), http://www.apa.org/monitor/
julaug03/rehab.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
28. MORE, supra note 1.
29. MARION EXPERIMENT, supra note 13.
30. Elizabeth Marlow & Catherina Chesla, Prison Experiences and Reintegration of Males Parolees,
ADVANCES IN NURSING SCI. E-17 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2886197/
and https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34287.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); JAMES,
supra note 26, at 7.
31. MORE, supra note 1.
32. Gorman, supra note 8, 472, 477.
33. Id. at 452–53.
34. MORE, supra note 1.
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35

whose personhood is redeemed through both inner and communal work. In
contrast, current prison practices often model cruelty and abuse while
36
expecting—quite illogically—that inmates develop into better people.
One should be cautious, however, not to construe More’s Utopia as a
forthright call to reform penal practice in early modern England. Although some
of More’s proposals for reintegrating prisoners through work have become reality
in subsequent centuries, within Utopia’s framework, the intent of those proposals
remains equivocal. Nothing in Utopia is straightforward; even the word “utopia”
is ambiguous because, in Ancient Greek, it can mean both “a good place” and
“no place,” and many of the names of persons and places in Utopia point to
37
nonsense. More’s ambiguity, due partly to his position within Henry VIII’s
legal apparatus, and partly to the volatile political environment he inhabited,
requires us to treat Utopia with hermeneutic caution, yet frees us to embrace
satire and irony as forms of circumstantial truth, just as circumstantial evidence
38
must suffice when direct evidence is unobtainable.
More’s arguments for punishing theft with penal labor, rather than death,
become clearer when they are contextualized in the shifting attitudes towards the
death penalty in his legal environment. Throughout the Middle Ages, the death
penalty, which had been on the books for felonies, including theft above 12
39
pence, had been enforced only in a minority of cases. As Thomas A. Green has
taught us, juries often resorted to nullification, pre-screening of offenders, partial
verdicts, or simply refused to convict in order to shield “lesser” criminals from
40
the death penalty. The reputation and the circumstances of the accused (for
instance, whether the accused was angry or “in dire straits” when he committed
the crime) acted as mitigating circumstances in the decision of the medieval jury,
41
which had the “power to render verdicts against the evidence.” For the most
part, only inveterate reoffenders who posed a real danger to the community were
42
sentenced to death. This state of affairs changed dramatically in early modern
England, a period that was marked by “notable developments in the law of
35. Id.
36. Gorman, supra note 8.
37. MORE, supra note 1, at xxvi; Study Guides for Utopia, Tʜᴇ Cᴛʀ. FOR Tʜᴏᴍᴀs Mᴏʀᴇ Sᴛᴜᴅ. 2 (2005),
http://thomasmorestudies.org/utopia/Utopia_guide.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(listing Utopian names and places).
38. This ambiguity might come from writing Utopia under the reign of a sovereign known for his
mercurial and ruthless character. See Thomas Wolf, Social Utopia and Political Reality in Thomas More, 3 U.
TOL. L. REV. 327, 328–29 (1971). For R. W. Chambers, “Utopia is, in part, a protest against the New
Statesmanship: against the new idea of the autocratic prince to whom everything is allowed.” R. W. Chambers,
From Utopia and the Problems of 1516, in THOMAS MORE UTOPIA: A REVISED TRANSLATION BACKGROUND
CRITICISM 172, 173 (George M. Logan ed. 3d ed. 2011).
39. THOMAS GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL
TRIAL JURY 1200–1800 60–61 (1985).
40. Id. at 61.
41. Id. at 26.
42. Id.
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43

theft . . . either statutory . . . or judicial.” Consequently, 72,000 thieves were
44
hanged during the reign of Henry VIII alone. In Book I, Raphael bitterly
condemns the practice of putting thieves to death, noting that the death penalty
45
benefits neither the thieves nor the community, nor does it act as a deterrent.
Before we delve into the ways in which work transforms criminals in Utopia, we
need to become acquainted with the tradition of viewing English kings as
craftsmen because, as More argues implicitly, it is the sovereign who must craft
new, forward-looking laws for punishing criminals in ways that turn them into
useful members of society. In More’s Utopia, work unexpectedly binds together
the legal persons of the thief and the sovereign. Both thief and sovereign labor in
the service of the community: While the thief works towards his rehabilitation,
the sovereign works to insure the existence of punitive measures that allow the
thief to do so.
II. THE LEGAL PERSON OF THE KING AS A CRAFTSMAN
As Lisa Cooper has taught us, the king-as-craftsman is a significant trope in
46
the cultural history of England from the 9th to the 16th century. There are
numerous examples of the rex as artifex in the genre called the mirror of princes,
which are books that illustrate proper and desirable conduct for sovereigns:
[the mirror of princes] uses artisanal metaphors or episodes that involve
crafting figures to ask its readers, often more than once, to contemplate
the modes, means, and effects of princely action; each work brings the
artisan forward for (putatively) princely purview as a subject whose labor
the king must not only regulate, but upon which he must also depend and
47
model his own art of rule.
The trope of rex as artifex, fashions the personhood of the sovereign as
someone who must “forcefully wield the (human) tools at his disposal in the
48
crafting of a kingdom.” Law is perhaps the most impactful tool a monarch can
wield.
Thomas More extends the craftsmanship metaphor into the legal domain by
proposing in Book II of Utopia a legal personhood for the sovereign as craftsman
49
of new penal laws. These new laws do away with the death penalty and allow
convicts to redeem themselves through work beneficial to the community of the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 120.
MORE, supra note 1, at 57 n. 19.
Id.
LISA H. COOPER, ARTISAN AND NARRATIVE CRAFT: IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 147 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 154.
MORE, supra note 1.
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50

realm. Craftsmanship (and later, craftiness) becomes policy for the sovereign
51
who shapes consequential, forward-looking punishments for the convicts.
There are numerous examples of sovereigns wielding both craftsmanship and
52
craftiness in Book II of Utopia. In fact, the two coexist in the person of the
sovereign, whose raison d’état allows him to circumvent traditional (private)
53
morality for political (public) ends. One of these public ends for the leaders of
54
Utopia is keeping their people alive during combat. Privately, Utopians consider
55
war a bestial endeavor. For them bellum, the Latin word for war, comes via folk
etymology from beluarum, the Latin genitive plural of belua, “beast”:
Bellum utpote rem plane beluinam, nec ulli tamen beluarum formae in
tam assiduo, atque homini est usu, summopere abominantur [They
utterly despise war as an activity fit only for beasts, yet practiced more
56
by man than any other animal].
Faced with the destruction of their commonwealth, Utopian rulers employed
craftiness—in Latin ars and dolus—that is, skill and cunning, to preserve the
57
lives of their people. They outsource their wars to the Zapoletes, who are
58
amoral and gold-greedy and presumably deserve to die; they “shift their ground
59
silently by night or get away by some stratagem” if they are outnumbered; they
60
“fortify their camps thoroughly” and “with unbelievable speed”; and they invent
new kinds of weapons and war machines—for instance, an armor in which they
61
can swim as a standard part of their training. Utopian rulers prove
Machiavellian in their goals that always justify their means: they bribe the enemy
62
combatants to kill those among them who started the war or prevented
63
surrender —two of the very few instances in which the Utopians approve of the
64
death penalty. They consider these stratagems legitimate because “they pity the
mass of the enemy’s soldiers almost as much as their own citizens, for they know
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 201 n.102.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 201.
Id. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA: LATIN TEXT AND
ENGLISH TRANSLATION (George M. Logan, Robert M. Adams & Clarence H. Miller eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006).
57. Dolus, D. R. HOWLETT, DICTIONARY OF MEDIEVAL LATIN FROM BRITISH SOURCES (1997).
58. MORE, supra note 1, at 211.
59. Id. at 215.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 213.
63. Id. at 217.
64. Chronologically, of course, More’s sovereigns are pre-Machiavellian. Id.
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common people do not go to war of their own accord, but are driven to it by the
65
madness of princes.”
There is consistency between the leaders’ craftiness in war and their
ingenuity in fashioning for criminals a legal personhood that reforms them
through work rather than robbing them of their lives. The leaders’ legal
resourcefulness relies on biblical models—Thomas More is a Catholic martyr,
after all—for both the sovereign and for the criminal. The model for rulers is God
as artisan and maker of the world, while the model for criminals brings to mind
Adam and Eve’s transgression—not incidentally the theft of the forbidden fruit—
and their rehabilitation through manual work for him as well as manual work and
labor in childbirth for her.
Thomas More focuses on thieves to arouse moral outrage against the
injustices inherent in criminal sentencing in early modern England. Ironically,
More’s focus on finding alternative punishments for non-violent offenders is also
one of the reasons why Utopia resonates so well with American lawmakers.
Modern criminal sentencing has not been free of abuse. For instance, California
only recently revoked the life prison sentences mandated by Proposition 36, also
known as the three-strikes law, for non-violent offenders who no longer pose a
66
danger to society. In medieval England, juries imposed the death penalty on
thieves in a minority of cases, although they had the right to do so if the value of
67
the stolen goods was higher than 12 pence and the theft constituted a felony.
Many such felonies, however, were presented as mere criminal trespasses or not
prosecuted at all, probably because “there was no category of excusable, i.e.,
68
pardonable, theft,” and people were loath of sending their neighbors to death.
III. THE LEGAL PERSON OF THE THIEF AS A SOCIAL OUTCAST
This state of affairs changes with the Tudors, an age that experiences a
“regular thief genocide.” As I mentioned before, 72,000 thieves are hanged
69
during Henry VIII’s reign alone. More found this punishment both excessive
and unjust: In Book I, he elucidates the causes of theft by focusing on thieves as
70
needful people abandoned by an unjust society, rather than the act of theft itself.
For Thomas More, theft becomes the linchpin for an analysis of the social and
legal injustices of his time, and an oblique criticism of Henry VIII as a craftsman

65. Id. at 207.
66. Progress Report: Three Strikes Reform (Proposition 36); 1,000 Prisoners Released, STAN. L. SCH.
THREE STRIKES PROJECT & NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND (2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/
publications/ThreeStrikesReport_v6.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
67. Green, supra note 39, at 61.
68. Id. at 61.
69. MORE, supra note 1, at 57 n. 19.
70. Id.
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of unjust laws. As Logan, Adams, and Miller point out in the introduction to their
edition of Thomas More’s Utopia:
The analysis of the problem of theft constitutes a scathing indictment of a
system of “justice” in which the poor are “driven to the awful necessity
of stealing and then dying for it”. . . . The root cause of this situation lies
in the pride, sloth and greed of the upper classes. Noblemen live idly off
others’ labour, and also “drag around with them a great train of idle
servants” . . . who, when they are later dismissed, know no honest way of
71
making a living.
The moral failures of noblemen all but ensure the criminality of their
servants, who are first objectified for their masters’ use and then cast away with
no means to support themselves after they are no longer needed. The English
realities discussed in Utopia differ greatly from the ways Utopians treat their
criminals, who can redeem themselves through work either in the eyes of the
community, or at least in their own eyes, if their punishment is permanent.
Punishments in Utopia transform the thief’s legal personhood from an object of
social opprobrium into a subject able to reshape his social standing for the better.
If the English society wants to progress, More seems to suggest, justice must also
pertain to the social (not merely the criminal) realm. This idea is congruent with
the communal justice ideal that informs much of More’s work.
By drawing attention to the social causes of theft, Thomas More continues a
tradition of medieval literature that identifies poverty and need as conducive to
72
crime. In so doing, he brings theft before the communal conscience rather than
making it a failure of an individual’s character. Andrew Hope and Paul Strohm
explained the shift from collective to individual conscience in early modern
73
England. When it comes to the punishment of thieves, however, Thomas More
disregards this shift by making theft a crime motivated by social failings rather
than individual interests. He points out that the death penalty for theft opposes
the public good, especially since recidivist rates for theft remained high in
England:
. . . this way of punishing thieves goes beyond the call of justice, and is
not in any case for the public good. The penalty is too harsh in itself, yet
it isn’t an effective deterrent. Simple theft is not so great a crime that it

71. Id. at xxiv.
72. Louise O. Fradenburg, Needful Things, in MEDIEVAL CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL 49, 63–64
(Barbara A. Hanawalt & David Wallace eds., 1999).
73. Andrew Hope, Thomas More and Humphrey Monmouth: Conscience and Coercion in Reformation
England, in THEORIZING LEGAL PERSONHOOD IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 244 (Andreea D. Boboc ed.,
2015); PAUL STROHM, CONSCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2011).
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ought to cost a man his head, yet no punishment however severe can
74
restrain those from robbery who have no other way to make a living.
More paints a socially sympathetic picture of the thief as a crippled war
veteran who has fought hard to protect the common good and now is abandoned
in the name of guarding it: “These men, who have lost limbs in the service of the
common good or the king, are too shattered to follow their old trades and too old
75
to learn new ones.” More further drums up compassion for servants who turn to
theft after they are abandoned by masters who “live idly like drones off the labor
76
of others” and spend prodigally, but who are too stingy to support their former
77
servants when they become old or incapacitated:
Those who are turned out soon set about starving, unless they set about
stealing. What else can they do? Then when a wandering life has taken
the edge off their health and the gloss off their clothes, when their faces
look worn and their garments are tattered, men of rank will not care to
engage them. And country folk do not dare to do so, for they don’t have
to be told that one who has been raised softly to idle pleasures, who has
been used to swaggering about like a bully with sword and buckler, is
likely to look down on the whole neighborhood and despise everybody
else as beneath him. Such a man cannot be put to work with spade and
mattock; he will not serve a poor man faithfully for scant wages and
78
sparse diet.
More highlights as a form of abuse the masters’ indifference to preparing
their former servants for alternative careers before abandoning them.
The servants’ displacement is as much of a reason for theft as the
displacement brought about by enclosure, whereby people metaphorically
become fodder for sheep. The views against enclosure expressed by Hythloday in
79
Book I were fairly popular in More’s time. No doubt, the gradual amalgamation
and fencing of open fields for sheep pasture, a process that began in the 12th
century and continued into the 19th, worsened the lot of many laborers and
resulted in the destruction of their homesteads. Hythloday details the lasting
economic impact of enclosure on the English people:
This enclosing has led to sharply rising food prices in many districts.
Also, the price of raw wool has risen so much that poor people . . . who
74. MORE, supra note 1, at 57.
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used to make cloth can no longer afford it, and so great numbers are
forced from work to idleness. One reason is that after so much new
pasture-land was enclosed, rot killed a countless number of sheep – as
80
though God were punishing greed by sending on the beasts a murrain
that rightly should have fallen on the owners! . . . For the high cost of
living causes everyone to dismiss as many retainers as he can from his
household; and what, I ask, can these men do but rob or beg? And a man
81
of courage is more easily persuaded to steal than to beg.
Hythloday argues that all these social ills not only set people up for failure
through pernicious social conditioning and practices but also punish the people
for the system’s failure:
Certainly, unless you cure these evils it is futile to boast of your justice in
punishing theft. Your policy might look superficially like justice, but in
reality it is neither just nor expedient. If you allow young folk to be
abominably brought up and their characters corrupted, little by little,
from childhood; and if then you punish them as grown-ups for
committing the crimes to which their training has consistently inclined
them, what else is this, I ask, but first making them thieves and then
82
punishing them for it.
IV. REFORMING THE THIEF THROUGH LABOR
Having constructed the legal person of the English thief as a composite of
individual misdeeds and social ills, Thomas More proceeds to argue that any
effort of the individual towards self-reformation and improvement needs a
corresponding effort from the society, which should not only punish the thief for
his transgressions but also create suitable conditions for him to reform. What
might these reforms of character and society look like?
Raphael Hythloday’s strategies for reforming the thief rely on two different
models: the first one comes from the utopian society of the Polylerites, who live
in a vassal country that pays tribute to the Persian king; the second, from the land
of Utopus himself. As Erik Wolf has pointed out, Thomas More combines the
Platonic ideal of reforming the criminal through punishment (as expressed, for
instance, in Plato’s laws) with the practical objective of advancing the public
83
good, since thieves are made to work on public projects. Here, the Latin

80. See generally Murrain, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/murrain
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vocabulary changes from ars to labor, a word that in the Medieval Latin
vocabulary of work connotes toil, exertion, and pain. (We retain the same
84
connotations today when we talk of a woman being in labor.) Readers are told
that, aside from constant labor (praeter asiduum laborem), the thieves’ lives are
85
quite comfortable (nihil incommodi est in vita).
Unless they also committed atrocities, thieves in the land of the Polylerites
preserve their freedom of movement and are fed from public stores or supported
through alms; they contribute to the commonwealth through their hard work and
retain their ties to the community-at-large. Thieves are easily identified because
they all wear the same distinctive uniform—in some districts they must wear a
86
badge—and because the tip of one of their ears is cut off. Their punishment is
so crafted—and here More’s Catholicism comes through again—that it destroys
87
sin and saves sinners. Since they are treated well, convicts cannot but become
88
good people: Servantis hominibus atque ita tractatis ut bonos esse necesse sit.
As long as one does good work, “no one is quite without hope of gaining his
freedom eventually if he accepts his punishment in a spirit of patient obedience
89
and gives promise of good future conduct.”
The sovereign of the Polylerites does not profit from theft because restitution
of goods is made to the owner, not to the prince, as was the custom in many
European countries. Erasmus, one of More’s closest friends, deplores this custom
90
in his work, The Education of a Christian Prince. Money was a significant
reason behind so many hangings in Henry VIII’s time because, once a felon was
91
killed, his property reverted to the crown. Henry VIII was infamous not only for
92
his murderous bent but also for his obsession with accumulating wealth. Like
More, Erasmus opposed the death penalty on principle, advising that “a prince
should try every remedy before resorting to capital punishment, keeping in mind
that the state is a single body. No one cuts off a limb if [the patient] can be
93
restored to health by any other means.”
Work for the public good is one such remedy, especially because thieves are
shown that their transgressions have put them in the debt of their communities,
which like Utopia, are founded on work. In the community established by
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Utopus, the dignity of work is repeatedly emphasized. Here, we encounter an
additional synonym in the Latin text—opus—which adds a layer of
95
meaningfulness and creativity to work by stressing its completion. Immediately
after Utopus conquers the country, “[h]e put[s] not only the natives to work at
this task, but all his own soldiers too, so that the vanquished would not think the
96
labor a disgrace.”
Utopia relies on a stratification of work, with intellectual work ranking
highest and the hunting and slaughtering of animals ranking lowest. But given
that everyone works, the punishment as work is dignified and hopeful. People
can advance their position in society by flaunting their skills and talents at their
current job, and eventually graduating to higher-ranking labor. Conversely,
intellectuals can lose their job if they prove inefficient: “[i]f any of these scholars
disappoints the hopes they had for him, he is sent packing, to become a workman
97
again.” Work thus becomes the engine of social mobility. The dignity of
punishment is based on the dignity of work and informs the dignity of the
criminal’s legal person; such punishment reintegrates criminals into society
through their achievements and contributions to the commonwealth.
Everyone works in Utopia, including the community leaders (syphogrants),
“who by law are free not to work: yet they don’t take advantage of the privilege,
98
preferring to set a good example to their fellow citizens.” Work would have
resonated with religious and political leaders in Thomas More’s time. Cardinal
Wolsey was an extremely hard worker for the young Henry VIII, for whom
decision-making and signing off on documents proved loathsome; the older
Henry, however, became “an exceptionally [informed and] hard-working
monarch” in his own right, relying on an efficient network of postal messengers
99
that was frequently dealt with and dispatched within the same day.
While regular citizens merely work six-hour days, heinous criminals are
100
enslaved and made to work constantly; they are always kept fettered. The
Utopian punishment for criminals is harsher in comparison to the punishments
101
the Polylerites mete out to their felons. Utopians reserve slavery, however, for
atrocities committed by their own people, whom they punish the harshest, since
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they chose to become criminals despite proper upbringing and education.
Having avoided the internal work necessary to become citizens who live
productively doing the kinds of honest work they might enjoy, criminals must
103
now accept forced labor—the lowest option in the hierarchy of work. In
addition to enslaving their own inveterate criminals, Utopians take into slavery
(or, one might say, into rescue) foreign felons who have been condemned to
104
death in their own countries. Slavery in Utopia is neither shameful nor
exceptionally hard. In fact, some poor people from other countries choose it
willingly:
A third class of slaves consists of hard-working penniless drudges from
other nations who voluntarily choose slavery in Utopia. Such people are
treated with respect, almost as kindly as citizens, except that they are
assigned a little extra work, on the score that they’re used to it. If one of
them wants to leave, which seldom happens, no obstacles are put in his
105
way, nor is he sent off empty-handed.
Slavery in Utopia thus lacks the social stigma that a modern audience expects
and is only differentiated by the types and the quantities of work that slaves are
allowed to do. Destigmatizing former criminals makes all the difference since
often stigma continues to separate former convicts from the community-at-large
long after they have paid their debts to society by imprisonment or hard labor.
Even though Utopians do not mark their felons physically, they mark them
psychologically by reshaping their habits of viewing and approaching their work
106
through the tasks. Pamela H. Smith has written provocatively about the ways in
107
which work produces knowledge and ultimately reshapes the body. Early
modern artisans regarded imitation through repetition as “a learned bodily habit
that became a cognitive practice and, finally, led to knowledge and the
108
production of effects.” Stripped of its modern racial connotations, slavery, as
advocated by More, involves a continuous reshaping of the body and the mind of
109
criminals through repetition, as slaves are constantly kept at work. From a
modern standpoint, one may ask what kind of benefit might come from
performing the lowest (and one may argue, the cruelest) kinds of work, such as
hunting and slaughtering animals. Incidentally, however, this was precisely the
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

MORE, supra note 1, at 185.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 193.
PAMELA H. SMITH, THE BODY OF THE ARTISAN: ART AND EXPERIENCE IN THE SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION 98 (2004) (using Leonardo da Vinci as an example of how artists’ judgments of bodies within
their art informed judgments about their own bodies).
108. Id.; see also PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 52 (1990).
109. MORE, supra note 1, at 187.

59

2016 / Work and the Legal Person in Thomas More’s Utopia
work that fit best the now-unemployed, former servants of rich landowners—that
is, those who had “been raised softly to idle pleasures, who ha[d] been used to
110
swaggering about like bull[ies] with sword and buckler.” In medieval and early
modern times, hunting remained a pleasurable pursuit of the upper class, a
pursuit in which servants participated. Therefore, one may interpret More’s
proposal as restoring those servants, now destitute, to some of their former glory.
More’s utopian slavery rehabituates criminals through work, allowing them to
achieve productive lives in the communities they previously wronged.
In Utopia, all property is held in common and private property is absent, so
even petty criminals like thieves wrong the whole community through their
111
actions. One consequence of this structure is, as Stephanie Elsky has noted, that
“in a land with no private property, laws are almost superfluous and customs take
112
their place.” (Here the puns on More, Morus, and mores come to mind.) For
Utopians, common law is defined by custom, which draws on a collective source
of authority—just like work. Writing in 1528, Christopher St. German, one of
Thomas More’s contemporaries, noted that English common law relies partially
on custom:
The third ground of the law of England stands upon diverse general
customs of old time used through all the realm . . . the said customs . . .
have always been taken to be good and necessary for the commonwealth
of the realm; therefore they have obtained the strength of a law,
113
insomuch as he that does against them, does against justice.”
The Utopians’ reductive approach to punishment is based on simplifying
what few laws they have so their interpretation aligns with community values.
In all areas of life, Utopians recognize how significant custom is in shaping
114
human behavior. The custom of rectifying anti-social behavior through work,
rather than imprisonment or death, addresses the exigencies of Thomas More’s
own age in a constructive, integrative manner. Henry VII and Henry VIII both
tried to solve the problem of vagrants, loiterers, beggars and other suspect
115
persons who seemed able to work but refused to do so. The Vagabonds and
Beggars Act from 1494 (11 Henry VII c.2) mandated that such persons be put in
stocks for three days, be kept on a diet of bread and water, and then be thrown
out of town; those able to work were ordered to return to their places of
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residence. In the Vagabond Act of 1530 lightened the punishment, probably
117
given the overwhelming number of vagrants. Whipping replaced the stocks for
able-bodied vagabonds and beggars who refused to work, whereas those poor
who were aged, sick, or disabled could apply for a begging license from their
118
local justice of peace.
Imprisonment (and often a fine) was the punishment for “those who left their
119
employment prematurely” in 1445, and for those “who would not work for
120
prescribed rates until they should have found security to do so” in 1515.
Imprisonment in medieval and early modern times could be grim for
impoverished prisoners who lacked support and patronage, since prisoners often
121
depended on charity and friends for sustenance. Pugh notes a couple of cases
122
from the 13th and 14th centuries where prisoners died of hunger. To avoid such
situations, the Gaols Acts of 1532 mandated that gaols “be sited in populous
places so that the largest possible sums could be contributed by the pious as
123
prisoners’ alms.” But even those prisoners who fared well suffered from
overcrowding conditions and the corrupt atmosphere of the prison, which
124
habituated criminals to more numerous and increasingly sophisticated crimes.
Thomas More responds to these exigencies by humanizing punishments through
meaningful work and retaining harsher methods (fetters, hard labor) only for the
most incorrigible of criminals. Through its polysemy of work, Thomas More’s
Utopia demonstrates how the legal person of the legislator and the legal person
of the criminal inform one another in the practice of justice. Subversively, Utopia
suggests a better model of personhood for the ruthless Henry VIII, that is, a royal
person deeply concerned with the judicious imposing of punishments and the
rehabilitation of criminals, with the goal of ultimately reintegrating them into the
community of the realm.
Once we translate Utopia with the legal concerns of a modern audience in
mind, we become aware of its contemporary resonance: treating felons humanely
(not only for the sake of their humanity but also for the sake of ours),
destigmatizing them after they pay their debts to society, and injecting hope and
meaning into the punitive system.
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